Re: Complaint of Mortgage and Real Estate Fraud that involved forgery, federal mail fraud, wire fraud and bank fraud & Deprivation of Property Rights

In America, no one is considered to be above the law. The United States Constitution is considered the supreme law of the land both because of its content and because its authority is derived from the people.

In writing this letter, I am not looking for sympathy. I am not looking to be rewarded. I am not seeking the punishment of the parties involved. However, as a last resort, I am bringing this matter to your attention, because, as an American taxpayer, I am a victim from the crimes of mortgage/real estate fraud and predatory lending that involved forgery, federal mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud & deprivation of property rights (see Exhibit 6) from financial institutions.

I am filing this complaint because I am a victim of predatory lending by civil conspiracy of all the parties and entities mentioned in this letter. I am also filing this complaint under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and U.S. Code wire-fraud statute (Title 18 U.S.C. 1343) against those individuals and companies who have directly participated in the civil conspiracy of Mortgage and Real Estate fraud and made materially misleading statements and who acted with knowledge or deliberate reckless disregard of the true facts. New Century Mortgage Company (New Century), focusing on the sub-prime market, lent to individuals who did not satisfy the credit, documentation or other underwriting standards. 

These New Century Officers’ and companies’ intent to deceive or deliberate reckless disregard for the truth are demonstrated by substantial statistical and substantial circumstantial evidence supporting a strong inference of scienter. Furthermore, it was only on May 24, 2007, after New Century’s bankruptcy, was it admitted that the company, through its independent investigation, had found “errors” in the company’s previously filed annual financial statements as well as newspaper articles are now describing how financial greed was at the core of loan volumes with loosed underwriting guidelines. Please take notice that [New Century Mortgage (New Century) is not named in this complaint due to its filing for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code]. 

Sec. 15 Ability to repay: Lender must believe borrower can repay (presumed affordable if debt-to-income ratio below 50%). Sec. 20 Verification of ability to repay loan: Lender must document ability to repay. The public has an interest in the orderly administration of justice (a $289,000 stated income loans which was originally used primarily with self-employed borrowers was given to my wife, a W-2 wage earners of only $2,786.99 and her name was not listed on the deed or the mortgage note of the property since I had bought it in 1999 ( see Exhibit 5 & 6 -- IRS tax history)). Public policy favors the proper adjudication of claims. (See U.S. v. Premises and Real Prop. At 4492 S. Livonia Rd., F. 2d 1258, 1263 (2d Cir. 1989), see also U.S. v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F. 2d 896, 902 (2d Cir. 1992) (a claimant’s interest in his home merits special constitutional protection). 

Many of the acts and transactions that constitute violations of law in this letter of complaint, including the dissemination to the public of untrue statements of material facts, directly or indirectly, used the means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, including, but not limited to, the United States mails, interstate telephone communications and the facilities of national securities exchanges (Section 11 & 15) since as outlined in this complaints, many of the individuals and companies acted with scienter, acting intentionally or with a deliberate reckless disregard of the true facts, in making or participating in the making of these misstatements and omissions that led ultimately to the deprivation of my property rights and the civil conspiracy of mortgage/real estate fraud, predatory lending including forgery, federal mail fraud, wire fraud and bank fraud in the issued of mortgage back securities as described below:

III. Officers of New Century

Many of those New Century officers’ now face a grand jury and criminal investigation by the United States Attorney for the Central District of California as well as an elevated, formal investigation by the SEC and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The New Century officers named in this complaint repeatedly signed sworn certifications attesting to the fair presentation of New Century’s financial statements in accordance with GAAP and the adequacy of the Company’s internal controls which were materially misstated when made as they failed to reveal New Century’s (now admitted ) violations of GAAP as well as (now admitted) material weaknesses in the Company’s internal controls. 

New Century’s senior executive officers also repeatedly stated that the credit quality of the Company’s mortgages was “strong,” “very high” and “higher” or “better” than it had been in the Company’s past as the result of purportedly “strict,” “improved” and “strong” underwriting controls and guidelines and risk management discipline, when the true facts were to the contrary.

New Century’s underwriting was not strengthened, but actually loosened beginning in 2003 and further loosened year-after-year from 2004-06, in order to continue to drive record-breaking loan volume through the Company’s origination system in the face of adverse industry trends and severe competition, with quantity at the expense of quality.

New Century officer Defendants Robert K. Cole, Brad A. Morrice, Edward F. Gotschall and Patti M. Dodge -- who controlled New Century’s financial reporting and were the public spokespersons of the Company -- each took personal advantage of the artificially inflated price for New Century securities by selling, in the aggregate, over $50 million of their personally-held New Century common stock during the Class Period and by receiving incentive bonuses and other substantial compensation and income based on New Century’s (mis)reported financial performance. Thus, by manipulating the financial data, the New Century Officers took advantage and enriched themselves at the expenses of unsophisticated home buyers like myself and my wife.

As officers and directors of a publicly-held company whose shares are registered with the SEC pursuant to the Exchange Act, traded on the New York Stock Exchange, and governed by the Federal securities laws, these individual Defendants each had a duty to disseminate promptly, accurate information with respect to the Company’s business, operations, financial statements and internal controls, and to correct any previously-issued statements that had become materially misstated or untrue. 

These individuals, because of their positions of control and authority as senior executive officers and directors of New Century, were able to and did control the content of the press releases, SEC filings and other public statements issued by New Century. 

1. Robert K. Cole (“Cole”), one of the Company’s co-founders, served as Chairman of the Board of Directors of New Century from December 1995 until December 31, 2006; as Chief Executive Officer of New Century from December 1995 until June 30, 2006.

2. Brad A. Morrice (“Morrice”), one of the Company’s co-founders, served as Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of New Century from December 1996 until his termination, on June 8,2007; as President and a director of the Company from 1995 until June 8, 2007;  

3. Edward F. Gotschall (“Gotschall”), one of the Company’s co-founders, served as Vice Chairman, Finance, of the Board of Directors of New Century from July 2004 until June 2006; as Chief Financial Officer of the Company from August 1998 until July 2004. Gotschall served as a member of the Finance Committee of the Board of Directors from its inception on January 9, 2006. 

4. Patti M. Dodge (“Dodge”) served as Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer of New Century from July 20, 2004 until November 14, 2006; and as Executive Vice President, Investor Relations from November 15, 2006. Prior to these positions, Dodge served as Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company (February 2002 until July 2004);

7. Michael M. Sachs (“Sachs”) served as a director of the Company from November 1995 through the end of the Class Period and was one of the Company’s founding shareholders. Sachs served as a member of the Board’s Audit Committee from 1998 through 2007, serving as its Chairman from2000 through 2006. Sachs also served as a member of the Compensation Committee (1998 to 2007)

9. Donald E. Lange (“Lange”) served as a director of the Company from November 2002 through the end of the Class Period. Lange served as a member of the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors from November 2002 to June 22, 2007. 

10. Terrence P. Sandvik (“Sandvik”) served as a director of the Company from November 1995 until May 17, 2005. 

12. Marilyn A. Alexander (“Alexander”) served as a director of the Company from May 18, 2005 until April 10, 2007.  Alexander served as a member of the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors from May 18, 2005 until April 10, 2007.  

13. William J. Popejoy (“Popejoy”) served as a director of the Company from 2002 until June 5, 2006. Popejoy served on the Board’s Compensation Committee from 2002 through 2005.  

14. David Einhorn (“Einhorn”) served as a director of the Company from March 31, 2006 until March 7, 2007. 

GAAP are those principles recognized by the accounting profession as the conventions, rules and procedures necessary to define accepted accounting practices at a particular time. The SEC has the statutory authority for the promulgation of GAAP for public companies and has delegated that authority to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (the “FASB”). SEC Regulation S-X (17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01(a)(1)) provides that financial statements filed with the SEC which are not presented in accordance with GAAP will be presumed to be misleading, despite footnotes or other disclosures.

As reported by analyst Zach Gast of The Center for Financial Research and Analysis (the “CFRA”), he questioned the credit quality of New Century’s more recent loans (but did not have access to internal underwriting guidelines and practices to confirm his beliefs): “Credit quality on more recently originated loans appears to have weakened substantially for NEW. Newer originations appear to be deteriorating more quickly than prior years, suggesting that underwriting may need to be tightened or that secondary market prices will suffer.”

While the New Century Officers stated repeatedly that the credit quality of the Company’s mortgages was “strong,” “excellent,” “very high” and “higher” or “better” than it had been in the Company’s past as the result of purportedly “strict,” “improved” and “strong” underwriting controls and guidelines and risk management discipline, the reality is that the percentage of New Century’s Mortgage Loans Held for Investment which were 60+ days delinquent grew from the first quarter of 2005 through the third quarter of 2006.

On or about March 16, 2006, the New Century Officers Cole, Morrice, Gotschall and Dodge filed the Company’s Form 10-K for the quarter and year ended December 31, 2005. The 2005 Form 10-K contained consolidated balance sheets and consolidated statements of earnings purporting to reflect the Company’s financial performance and assets and liabilities for the three months and year ended December 31, 2005 in accordance with GAAP. The 2005 Form 10-K also stated the following regarding New Century’s underwriting standards:

“Our loan origination standards and procedures are designed to produce high quality loans. These standards and procedures encompass underwriter qualifications and authority levels, appraisal review requirements, fraud prevention, funds disbursement controls, training of our employees and ongoing review of our employees’ work. We help to ensure that our origination standards are met by employing accomplished and season managers, underwriters and processors and through the extensive use of technology. We also have a comprehensive training program for the continuing development of both our existing staff and new hires. In addition, we employ proprietary underwriting systems in our loan origination process that improve the consistency of underwriting standards, assess collateral adequacy and help to prevent fraud, while at the same time increasing productivity.” 

The 2005 Form 10-K was signed by, among others, the New Century Officers: Cole, Morrice, Gotschall and Dodge. The New Century Officers’ repeated public statements that the Company had improved its loan performance by implementing “stricter” or “improved” underwriting standards were materially untrue and misleading when made. As set forth herein, the Company’s lower delinquency rates for 2003 and 2004 vintage loans were not the result of stricter underwriting standards, but rising home prices which, through loan servicing or otherwise, permitted borrowers who fell behind on mortgage payments to refinance their homes and “cash out” equity to temporarily catch up with their debt payments. As interest rates increased and home prices stopped rising (and decreased in some regions), New Century’s borrowers quickly fell behind on mortgage payments.

Contrary to Defendants’ repeated statements, underwriting standards were not increased, but actually loosened. Rather than increase the Company’s underwriting standards in the face of rising interest rates and a softening of the real estate market, New Century actually made repeated exceptions to and loosened its underwriting and offered higher risk products to continue to reach record mortgage volume in the face of severe industry competition. Moreover, New Century’s account executives and employees were highly motivated to close as many loans as possible given that sales and/or loan volume were key components of the variable part of their compensation. These facts are confirmed not only by the Company’s increased default rates set forth below.

As these data make clear, New Century, as compared to its peer lending companies, was far more likely to make a first lien loan to any given applicant. During 2005, New Century was 50% more likely to make such a loan, and in 2006, the Company was 62% more likely to make such a loan. The reported origination Data (compiled and reviewed data concerning New Century’s residential mortgage loansfor one-to-four-family homes that New Century reported pursuant to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810, (“HMDA”)) are summarized as follows:

Likewise, New Century denied second lien applicants much less often than did its peer subprime lending companies. As Graph 6 below reflects, in both 2005 and 2006, New Century rejected such applicants 31% less often:

On May 7, 2007, the front page of The Washington Post reported: “Pressure at Mortgage Firm Led to Mass Approval of Bad Loans.” The Washington Post reported: “[Y]ou didn’t want to turn away a loan because all hell would break loose,” [former New Century employee Maggie Hardiman] recountedin interviews. When she did, her bosses often overruled her and found another appraiser to sign off on it.Hardiman’s account is one of several from former employees of New Century that shed fresh light on an unfolding disaster in the mortgage industry, one that could cost as many as 2 million American families their homes and threatens to spill over into the broader economy. 

New Century has become the premier example of a group of companies that grew rapidly during the housing boom, selling working-class Americans with questionable credit huge numbers of “subprime” loans with “teaser” rates that typically rose after the first two years. This business transformed the once-tiny New Century into a lending powerhouse that was held up as a model of the mortgage

industry’s success. But now, with home values failing and adjustable loan rates rising, record numbers of homeowners are failing to make their payments.

And a detailed inquiry into the situation at New Century and other subprime lenders suggests that in the feeding frenzy for housing loans, basic quality controls were ignored in the mortgage business, while

the big Wall Street investment banks that backed these firms looked the other way. New Century, which filed for bankruptcy protection last month, has admitted that it underreported the number of bad loans it made in its financial reports for the first three quarter of 2006. Hardiman and other former employees of New Century interviewed said there was intense pressure from bosses to approve loans, even those with obviously inflated housing appraisals or exaggerated homeowner incomes.

Hardiman said she was fired for refusing to approve weak loans. Others said they left because they were pressured to pump loans through the system. A few were interviewed while they were worked at New Century but then lost their jobs after the firm filed for bankruptcy.

Although there were variations in their descriptions of the atmosphere in their offices, most said they were pushed to approve questionable loans. Several of the employees interviewed said they faced “unofficial quotas” of loans that had to be approved each day. A veteran appraiser who worked in Pearl River, N.Y., said he joined New Century because he heard the pay was good. That turned out to be true, but he quickly discovered that the place was a pressure cooker. He said he often was encouraged “to make loans work.”

Hardiman, the former New Century appraiser, said she was not surprised by the Company’s downfall. Few at the Company seemed to be thinking long-term when she was there. The message she heard

constantly from headquarters, which was broadcast at work conferences and in e-mails, was to approve more loans. “We were constantly told, ‘If you look the other way and let an additional three to four loans in a day that would mean millions more in revenue for New Century over the course of the week,” Hardiman said. She added that it seemed “no one, from the top levels down to the lower levels of the office, didn’t want those loans to go through.”

Similarly, on April 19, 2007, The Orange County Register reported: [S]ome New Century employees said the Company was under pressure to relax standards to compete in an industry where customers

could easily shop for a better deal. Amanda Milano, a former senior loan processor who worked at New Century for four years, said it was once a very solid company and that she felt like it was part of her family, but that she witnessed a deterioration in its guidelines last year.

Some former employees said New Century started making more exceptions to its guidelines in 2006, as the housing industry slowed down. Karen Waheed, an underwriter with the Home 123 retail unit

of New Century, said some loan applicants called themselves landscapers or “tree surgeons” and reported dubious incomes of $10,000 to $15,000 a month.

Waheed, who was laid off April 2 after three years with the Company, said exceptions were also made that allowed elderly borrowers on fixed incomes to get adjustable-rate loans that would eventually

become unaffordable. “It got to a point where I literally got sick to my stomach,” she said. “Every day I got home and would think to myself, I helped set someone up for failure.”   At the same time, the New Century Officers’ repeated public statements about purportedly “improved” and “stricter” underwriting were materially misstated when made. 

KPMG LLP (“KPMG”) served as the Company’s outside auditor from 1995 until its resignation on April 27, 2007. KPMG issued unqualified opinions on the Company’s financial statements and management’s assessment of internal controls for the year ended December 31, 2005. 

Public investors, creditors and others rely on independent, registered public accounting firms to audit financial statements and assess internal controls when deciding whether to invest in or do business with a public company. The PCAOB, established by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, is responsible for the development of auditing and related professional practice standards that are required to be followed by registered public accounting firms. On April 16, 2003, the PCAOB adopted as its interim standards Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (“GAAS”) as described by the American Institute ofCertified Public Accountants Auditing Standards Board’s Statement of Auditing Standards No. 95,Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, and related interpretations in existence on that date.  

Accordingly, an auditor’s reference to “the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States)” includes a reference to GAAS in existence as of April 16, 2003. For simplicity, all reference to GAAS hereinafter includes the standards of the PCAOB. During the Class Period, KPMG issued an unqualified opinion on the Company’s financial statements for the year-ended December 31, 2005, as well as an unqualified opinion regarding New Century management’s assessment of internal controls as of December 31, 2005. KPMG also completed reviews of New Century’s interim unaudited financial statements for the quarters ended March 31, 2006, June 30, 2006 and September 30, 2006.

KPMG consented to the incorporation of its unqualified opinion on the Company’s financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2005, and its opinion regarding New Century management’s assessment of internal controls over financial reporting as of December 31, 2005. In both of its opinions, KPMG stated that it performed its audits and evaluations in accordance with the standards of the PCAOB. Each of these statements was materially misstated when made as KPMG’s audits failed to comply with the standards of the PCAOB.

There are ten GAAS provisions, which are divided into three types of standards: (1) general standards, which provide guidelines for auditor staffing and maintaining independence from the client; (2) standards of fieldwork, which provide guidelines for audit planning, collecting evidential verification for audit

findings, and the proper evaluation of internal controls; and (3) standards of reporting, which are primarily concerned with ensuring that a company’s financial statements are presented in accordance with GAAP.

GAAS General Standard No. 3 states that: “Due professional care is to be exercised in the performance of the audit and the preparation of the report.” GAAS Standards of Field Work No. 1 states that: “The work is to be adequately planned and assistants, if any, are to be properly supervised.” GAAS Standards of

Field Work No. 2 states: “A sufficient understanding of the internal control structure is to be obtained to plan the audit and to determine the nature, timing and extent of tests to be performed.” GAAS Standards of Field Work No. 3 states: “Sufficient competent evidential matter is to be obtained through inspection ,

observation, inquiries, and confirmations to afford a reasonable basis for an opinion regarding the financial statements under audit.” GAAS Standards of Reporting No. 1 states: “The report shall state whether the financial statements are presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).”

At all relevant times, KPMG violated all of these GAAS provisions. In order to effectively audit New Century’s compliance with GAAP and the adequacy of the Company’s internal controls, KPMG was required to, but did not, follow these GAAS standards in evaluating New Century’s underwriting

standards and practices, reserving methodology and accounting for Residual Interests in securitizations structured as sales. KPMG failed to comply with the standards of the PCAOB in auditing New Century’s Allowance for Repurchase Losses reserve and related internal controls.

Information regarding New Century’s decreasing underwriting practices and loan quality and increasing delinquencies, defaults and default loss severity throughout 2005 and at the time of KPMG’s audit was available to KPMG and, according to public statements by Dodge, KPMG purportedly spent significant time reviewing the Company’s data in its 2005 audit. Thus, it was incumbent upon KPMG to exercise due professional care in performing its audit; to adequately plan its audit; to obtain a sufficient understanding of New Century’s internal controls; and to obtain sufficient competent evidential matter in auditing New Century’s finances. KPMG failed to conduct its audit in compliance with all of these GAAS provisions. Had KPMG performed its audit consistent with GAAS, it would have uncovered New Century’s growing repurchase claims backlog & related poor internal controls.

In auditing New Century’s internal controls, KPMG also failed to comply with GAAS, to exercise due professional care in performing its audit; to adequately plan its audit; to obtain a sufficient understanding of New Century’s internal controls; and to obtain sufficient competent evidential matter regarding New Century’s adherence to internal controls, given KPMG’s failure to uncover New Century’s repeated lack of compliance and numerous exceptions to New Century’s underwriting guidelines. KPMG was required by GAAS, but failed to test on a sufficient basis whether New Century’s mortgage loans were in compliance with its underwriting standards as part of its audit planning, assessment and testing of internal controls. 

Standard and Poors issued credit ratings for New Century. It is designated as a Nationally Recognized Statiscal Rating Organization by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

VIII. Trustee, Agent & Servicers

According to the SEC, Nelson Mc Kee/FA- filing is the agent in the SEC for Deutsche banks. Servicers: Chase Home Finance & Real Time Solutions, Inc..

Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., (Deutsche) as nominal trustee for the holders of various mortgages and mortgage-backed Securities including the one that Chase Home Finance was servicing which is now transferred to Real Time Solutions, Inc., conducted in an illegal foreclosure actions in the state of Massachusetts, since it was clear that the mortgage/real estate fraud, predatory lending that involved forgery, federal mail fraud, wire fraud and bank fraud & the Deprivation of my Property Rights, under false pretenses, without the legal standing to bring such suits, and without complying with Massachusetts and Federal law governing its activities as a trust company which seems to be a pattern of corrupt and illegal activity from many feedback that I have heard from people with similar situations.

Because of the undeniable and irrefutable facts and evidences of mortgage/real estate fraud, predatory lending that involved forgery, federal mail fraud, wire fraud and bank fraud, there is a patent defect in the chain of assignment of the note and mortgage. Thus, the foreclosure action was illegal and immoral. Federal law prohibits the use of “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of  any debt…” including the “false representation of …. the character, amount, or legal status of any debt…” and the “threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken…” 15 U .S.C. 169 2e. 

The servicer or the trustee of a mortgage knows that it is not assignable at common law but only in equity and that he takes it subject to all equities existing in favor of the mortgagor. It is therefore the duty of the assignee to inquire of the mortgagor if there is any reason why it should not be paid.”); Halla v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 412 Ill. 39, 104 N.E.2d 790 (1952); Inland Real Estate Corp. v. Oak Park Trust & Savings Bank, 127 Ill. App.3d 535, 542 469 N.E.2d 204, 209 (1^st Dist. 1983) (“It is a well established general rule that the assignee of a trust deed in the nature of a mortgage takes it subject to the same defenses that existed between the original parties to the instrument”);Schoenbrod v. Rosenthal, 36 Ill. App.2d 112, 183 N.E.2d 188 (1^st Dist. 1962); Ainsworth Corp. v. Cenco Inc., 107 Ill. App.3d 435, 437 N.E.2d 817 (1^st Dist.1982); Matter of Neprozatis’ Estate, 62 Ill. App.3d 563, 569, 378 N.E.2d 1345, 1349 (1^st Dist. 1978)(“fraud will vitiate a contract, making it voidable at the option of the defrauded party)[citation omitted]; Cain v. Cross, 293 Ill. App.3d 255, 687 N.E.2d 1141 (5^th Dist.1997). 

The breach proximately caused injuries to my wife and I since we were misled as to the true terms of the loan since the secure loan was a higher-than-par rate and the broker pocket a yield-spread premium (a commission on the higher rate) from the lender since it was acting as finder for New Century. (Martin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 163 Ill. 2d 33, 53, 205 Ill. Dec. 443, 643 N.E.2d 734 (1994)). At the time of the closing, we did not know the true meaning of “yield-spread premium” on the loan documents.

B. Failure to meet these requisites may render the trustee's sale void. In Cox v. Helenius, 103 Wn.2d 383, 693 P.2d 683 (1985), the court concluded that a trustee's sale was void under circumstances where the borrower had filed an action contesting the obligation and that action was pending at the time of the trustee's sale. The action was filed after service of the notice of default but before service of the notice of foreclosure and trustee's sale.

C. Chase Home Finance transfer the note after I exercised my legal right to rescind the mortgage and the note. Thus, Deutsche National Trust Company as the trustee was not properly appointed and do not have the authority to act and foreclose on Debtor‘s property. When an eager, Deutsche National Trust Company, "jumps the gun", the actions are equally void.

Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. (“Deutsche Bank”) is an investment bank and acted as one of the underwriters with respect to the public offering of New Century securities in June 2005. Deutsche Bank’s U.S. headquarters are located at 60 Wall Street, New York, New York 10005.

On May 23, 2007, my house located at 26-28-30 Cedar Street, Lowell, MA 01852 was sold illegally and fraudulently and my property rights deprived in the process. Here are the relevant evidences of predatory lending and facts to support my complaint of mortgage and real estate fraud (see Exhibits 1, 2, 3 & 4):

In Exhibit 1, New Century Mortgage denied the mortgage application on January 22, 2004.

In Exhibit 2, New Century Mortgage denied the mortgage application on March 9, 2004.

In Exhibit 3, Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company (Commonwealth) committed fraud and false statement when it report on March 29, 2004 that the title was clear for closing with the intent to cover up for the civil conspiracy with the other parties acting as finder for New Century.   Commonwealth acting on behalf of New Century in providing false information by failing to report that there was an existing 2^nd mortgage on the property which resulted in the over financing of my residential home. Is this a pattern of conduct of Commonwealth? 

In Exhibit 4, through mortgage fraud & false information amongst the New Century Mortgage Corporation and its representatives, I was issued a mortgage that I should not have gotten at all as illustrated in Exhibits 1 and 2 since my wife was only holding a temporary, seasonal and on call part-time employment as a substitute teacher that resulted in the stripping of my equity, reverse redlining and my debt liability surpassed my asset (a $289,000 stated income loans which was originally used primarily with self-employed borrowers was given to my wife, a W-2 wage earners of only $2,786.99 and her name was not listed on the deed or the mortgage note of the property since I had bought it in 1999 ( see Exhibit 5 & 6 -- IRS tax history)).   Thus, New Century Mortgage underwriter failed to verify the employment status of my wife. Also, Beacon Appraisal, 396 W. Broadway, Boston, MA 02127(conducted the appraisal on the property) by failing to report that there was an existing 2^nd mortgage on the property which resulted in the over financing of my residential home. 

XI. Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC)

The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) was established on March 10, 1979, pursuant to title X of the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978 (FIRA), Public Law 95-630. According to the FFIEC data, our debt to income ratio at the time of the refinancing transaction was ‘low’.    Also, according to our IRS income tax filing as well (see Exhibit 5).

Census Income Information